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Abstract In this work, an eavesdropping-aware routing and spectrum allocation
approach is proposed utilizing network coding (NC) in elastic optical networks
(EONs). To provide physical layer security in EONs and secure the confidential
connections against eavesdropping attacks using NC, the signals of the confiden-
tial connections are combined (XOR-ed) with other signals at different nodes in
their path, while transmitted through the network. The combination of signals
through NC significantly increases the security of confidential connections, since
an eavesdropper must access all individual signals, traversing different links, in
order to decrypt the combined signal. A novel heuristic approach is proposed, that
solves the combined network coding and routing and spectrum allocation (NC-
RSA) problem, that also takes into account additional NC constraints that are
required in order to consider a confidential connection as secure. Different routing
and spectrum allocation strategies are proposed, aiming to maximize the level of
security provided for the confidential demands, followed by an extensive perfor-
mance evaluation of each approach in terms of the level of security provided, as
well as the spectrum utilization and blocking probability, under different network
parameters. Performance results demonstrate that the proposed approaches can
provide efficient solutions in terms of network performance, while providing the
level of security required for each demand.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Elastic optical networks (EONs) provide improved transmission performance and
more flexible spectrum allocation compared to conventional WDM optical net-
works. In EONs, the C-band can be separated in slices (frequency slots) of 25,
12.5, and 6.25 GHz. Subsequently, a connection can be allocated to a number of
frequency slots to satisfy its required bit rate. To establish a connection in EONs,
a viable solution to the RSA problem must be found, which consists of finding a
path (routing - R) from the source to the destination, along with the allocation
of the required spectrum slots (spectrum allocation - SA). To find a feasible RSA
solution, three basic constraints must be satisfied: (i) the spectrum continuity con-
straint, where each demand must be allocated the same frequency slots on each link
of the selected path, (ii) the non-overlapping constraint, where a frequency slot
can only be allocated to one demand at a time, and (iii) the spectrum contiguity
constraint, where the slots serving each demand must be contiguous [1, 2].
Optical networks are considered one of the most important critical infrastruc-
tures, as many services (e.g., cloud computing) and critical applications (e.g.,
national security, public health) rely on these networks for data exchange. Due
to the type and the amount of data transmitted, the security of optical networks
is of paramount importance, since even attacks over a short time period can still
compromise large amounts of critical data.
There are numerous real-world scenarios where optical networks were breached
(e.g., utilizing tapping devices to access the signal transmitted via optical fibers).
Hence, optical layer security has received considerable attention in recent years.
Optical layer security can be divided into different categories based on the type
and the purpose of the threat. Such security threats include the observation of the
existence of communication (privacy), the unauthorized use of spectrum (authen-
tication), the manipulation or destruction of data (integrity), the denial of service
(availability), and the unauthorized access to information (confidentiality) [3–11].
The focus of this work is on confidentiality, where an adversary tries to and can
have undetected access to confidential data from an optical communication channel
(i.e., eavesdropping) for a prolonged period of time.
Network coding (NC) is a technique where data of different connections are
combined and transmitted through the network [13]. In this work, NC is used to
provide security in EONs against eavesdropping attacks by encrypting the confi-
dential data. Thus, with the use of NC, it is extremely difficult for an adversary to
compromise any confidential connection, since a number of different connections
that traverse different routes will have to be compromised, in order for the attacker
to make sense of the accessed confidential data. This work significantly extends
the concept presented in [12] by providing an extended analysis of NC within op-
tical networks, followed by novel policies for allocating a path and spectrum slots
for the confidential demands. Further, additional properties are considered for the
paths used in the XOR operations, which are subsequently incorporated within
the heuristic algorithms. Finally, extensive simulations are performed to compare
all policies in terms of spectrum utilization, blocking probability, and the level of
security provided for the confidential demands.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The general concept of network
coding and its implementations in optical networks are discussed in Section 2. The
combined NC-RSA problem is described in Section 3, followed by the proposed
heuristic algorithm in Section 4. Next, the performance results are presented in
Section 5, while Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Network Coding Implementations in Optical Networks
The application of NC to optical networks from the algorithmic and infrastruc-
tural perspectives has been investigated by the authors in [13]. Furthermore, using
NC in conjunction with the RSA process, several connections can combine their
transmitted data, enabling protection, multicasting, and security functionalities
within the optical network. In the following, a short description of how these func-
tionalities can be achieved, along with a discussion on the physical implementation
of NC in optical networks are presented.
(a) NC-based Protection in Optical Networks
NC-based protection in optical networks has been widely studied [13–16]. For such
an approach, intermediate network nodes process a set of signals such that a desti-
nation node will receive a linear combination of signals over several disjoint paths.
Then, in the case of a failure in the primary path, the destination node will still
be able to recover the failed signal from the rest of the received combined signals
arriving at the destination from paths that are not affected by the failure. For
instance, consider the network shown in Fig. 1(a). In this example, connections
1 − 4 − 6 and 2 − 5 − 6 transmit datastreams a and b, respectively. To provide
protection for the primary paths, using network coding, source nodes 1 and 2 also
transmit their datastreams to node 3, which performs an XOR operation (a⊕ b).
Subsequently, the resulting signal (a ⊕ b) is transmitted to the destination (i.e.,
node 6). In the case that connection 1 − 4 − 6 fails, datastream a can still be
recovered by the destination node as a = (a ⊕ b) ⊕ b. Similarly, in the case that
path 2− 5− 6 fails, datastream b can still be obtained as b = (a⊕ b)⊕ a.
Fig. 1: Utilizing NC for (a) protection, (b) multicasting, and (c) security.
(b) NC-based Multicasting in Optical Networks
NC can also be used for multicasting in optical networks. Authors in [13, 17, 18]
demonstrate the utilization of network coding for multicasting connections to im-
prove network throughput. The concept of NC in multicasting is to divide the
original traffic into different lower-rate sub-streams and design trees in such a way
that the destination nodes will be able to decode the incoming signals based on
specific XOR operations. In Fig. 1(b), assume that node 1 is the source node and
needs to transmit datastreams a and b to both destination nodes 5 and 7. One
possible solution using network coding is to transmit datastream a to node 5 and
datastream b to node 7, perform the XOR operation (a⊕b) at node 4, and transmit
the resulting datastream (a⊕ b) to both destination nodes through paths 4−6−7
and 4 − 6 − 5. Hence, each node can obtain both a and b by using the received
signals. For example, node 5 receives datastream a and (a ⊕ b). Then, b can be
obtained through the process b = a ⊕ (a ⊕ b). A similar procedure can also be
performed at node 7 to obtain datastreams a and b [18, 19].
(c) NC-based Security in Optical Networks
Authors in [20] studied the effectiveness of linear network coding (LNC) in optical
networks to protect connections from security threats such as eavesdropping and
jamming attacks. To enhance the network with security capabilities, a confiden-
tial connection can transmit a coded version of its data. Hence, in the case of an
eavesdropping attack, the attacker must have knowledge of both the coded version
of the signal and all connections used to perform the XOR operations in order to
access the confidential data. Recently, work in [12] investigated the problem of net-
work security in elastic optical networks using NC through a heuristic approach.
This is also the main topic of this work, in which a significant extension of the
approach presented in [12] is provided.
Fig. 1(c) presents a simple example where network coding can be used to pro-
vide security for a confidential connection in an optical network. As shown in this
figure, the confidential datastream a is transmitted using path 1−2−6. Also, two
non-confidential connections are established in the network using paths 1− 3− 6
and 2− 5− 6, and transmit datastreams b and c, respectively. To provide security
for the confidential connection using path 1 − 2 − 6, source node 1 transmits a
coded version of datastream a, namely a⊕ b, over link 1− 2, and additional secu-
rity is provided at link 2 − 6 by also using connection 2 − 5 − 6 and datastream
c. Thus, (a ⊕ b ⊕ c) is transmitted at the second link of the confidential path.
To acquire the confidential datastream a at node 6, the receiver can perform the
operation a = b⊕ c⊕ (a⊕ b⊕ c). Hence, an eavesdropper must also gain access to
both datastreams b and c in the network in order to be able to make sense of the
confidential datastream a. In other words, the eavesdropper must simultaneously
tap 3 different links at different network locations to compromise datastream a.
(d) Physical Layer Implementation of NC in Optical Networks
In opaque networks, NC can be easily implemented, since signals can be received,
combined, and transmitted by the intermediate nodes, providing an encrypted
version of the signal at each link. However, for such a technique to work in trans-
parent optical networks, the nodes must be equipped with additional hardware
in order to perform the XOR operation at the physical (optical) layer. Further-
more, all involved signals must use the same spectrum resources in order for net-
work coding to be enabled. It was shown that NC in all-optical networks can be
realized by all-optical XOR logic gates. Specifically, a review of an optical im-
plementation of all-optical XOR gates was performed in [22]. All-optical XOR
gates are typically based on semiconductor optical amplifiers (SOAs) that offer
low-power consumption, easy deployment, and short-latency. Experimental works
have also demonstrated NC using XOR operations that can be performed at line
speed for transmission above 10 Gbps and up to 100 Gbps with different modu-
lation formats [23–25]. In addition, authors in [26] proposed and experimentally
demonstrated a coherent optical layer network coding scheme on polarization-
multiplexed differential quaternary phase-shift keying (PM-DQPSK) signals, in
which the two PM-DQPSK signal components in the network-coded signal occupy
the same channel and cannot be separated by conventional demultiplexing means.
Finally, authors in [27] demonstrated, using OFDM signals, that the NC technique
does not require symbol-level synchronization. Thus, the feasibility of optical NC
was clearly demonstrated and is a technology that could be implemented in EONs
to provide security at the physical layer against eavesdropping attacks.
3 Problem Description
To provide security for confidential connections in the network against eavesdrop-
ping attacks, the combined NC-RSA problem must now be solved. More specifi-
cally, in order to find the path and the spectrum required for a confidential con-
nection, the path is chosen so as to take advantage of the existing connections
established in the network, that are utilized to perform a number of XOR opera-
tions in the nodes that traverse the confidential path. Further, it should be noted
that the spectrum slots selected for the confidential connection can significantly
affect the choice of existing connections that can be involved in the XOR process.
To consider a confidential connection as secure when using network coding, the
following constraints must be satisfied.
– Encrypted Transmission (ET): All links of the path allocated to a confi-
dential connection must transmit an encrypted version of their data with at
least one XOR operation with other currently established connections in the
network.
– Frequency Slot Matching (FSM): At least a subset of the frequency slots
utilized by the confidential connection must have the same id with the slots of
the rest of the already established connections used in the XOR operations.
To satisfy the ET constraint, an existing connection must have at least two
common nodes with the confidential connection (the first node will be used to en-
crypt the confidential connection and the second node will be used to decrypt it).
Thus, an existing connection with at least two common nodes with the confidential
connection can either be used to provide security for the entire path of the confi-
dential demand (i.e., when the source and destination nodes are common nodes),
or it can be used to provide security for a segment of the confidential connection
(i.e., source/intermediate to intermediate/destination node). Also, in this work,
the order in which the common nodes are traversed by the connections involved
in the XOR process must be the same, which will also ensure that the direction
of the connections traversing the nodes are the same. Finally, the ET constraint
ensures that for a secure confidential connection, the selected existing connections
must collectively secure all links of the path allocated to that connection.
To satisfy the FSM constraint, at least a subset of the frequency slots utilized
by the confidential connection must have the same id with the frequency slots of the
rest of the existing connections used in the XOR operation. This is the case, since
it is assumed that no frequency conversion is performed at intermediate nodes, and
therefore, the signals used for the XOR operation must be on the same frequency.
However, the confidential connection is considered as secure even when only part
of the signal (a subset of the frequency slots) is XOR-ed, since the eavesdropper
would still have to access all connections used in the encryption process in order
to decrypt and make sense of the accessed confidential data.
Finally, it is important to note that to satisfy both constraints, all connections
involved in the encryption process (i.e., both the confidential and the currently
established connections used in the XOR operation) must be link-disjoint. This is
the case, since the connections used in the XOR operation must transmit signals
that are at least partially utilized on the same frequency. Thus, considering also
the non-overlapping constraint of the RSA problem, all paths involved in this
process must be link-disjoint.
The following example (Fig. 2) provides an illustration of the aforementioned
constraints in combination with the establishment of a secure confidential connec-
tion. In this example, 4 connections (p2, p3, p4, p5) are currently established in the
network, provisioned as shown in Table 1, where each connection, px, transmits
datastream cx. Further, a confidential connection p1 must be established in the
network, requiring 2 spectrum slots and using path 1− 4− 5.
Fig. 2: Example of network coding for the establishment of a secure confidential connection.
As also discussed previously, only the existing connections with two common
nodes with the confidential connection can be used to provide security for p1 using
NC. Thus, p4 and p3 cannot be used to provide security for p1, as p4 does not
have two common nodes with p1 and p3 traverses its common nodes with p1 in
the opposite order compared to p1. Further, the group of spectrum slots that
will be assigned for connection p1 is very important, since at least a subset of
the frequency slots utilized by the confidential connection as well as the already
existing connections that take part in the XOR process must be the same (FSM
constraint). Thus, if spectrum slots 4−5 were used for p1, then only p5 can be used
to provide security for the connection, while if spectrum slots 2− 3 are used, then
both p2 and p5 can be used to provide (a higher level of) security for p1. Table 2
presents the transmitted datastreams for each link of the confidential connection,
if allocated using spectrum slots 2−3. As shown in Table 2, an encrypted version of
the confidential signal is transmitted at all links of the path, satisfying also the ET
constraint. In this example, the destination node can successfully decrypt the data,
whereas the eavesdropper must gain access to multiple additional connections that
are allocated at link-disjoint paths (i.e., p2 and p5) apart from the confidential one,
in order to make sense of the accessed confidential datastream.
Table 1: Paths and spectrum slots allocated to existing
connections in the network.
Connection
Id
Path
Selected
Spectrum
Slots Allocated
p2 6− 4− 2− 3− 5 1− 3
p3 5− 3− 4 1− 4
p4 1− 2 1− 2
p5 1− 6− 7− 5 2− 5
Table 2: Datastream trans-
mitted at each link of the
confidential connection p1.
Link
Transmitted
datastream
1− 4 c1 ⊕ c5
4− 5 c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c5
4 Proposed Heuristic Algorithm
To solve the combined NC-RSA problem, the proposed heuristic algorithm is di-
vided into the routing (R) and spectrum allocation (SA) sub-problems. A network
planning scenario is considered, where all demands are known a priori and each
demand is described by a 4-tuple (s,d,B,c), denoting the source, destination, bit-
rate, and confidentiality, respectively. Confidentiality in this case is defined as a
binary variable which describes the demand as confidential (1) or non-confidential
(0). It is noted that different classes of confidential connections could be utilized
based on the minimum threshold of XOR operations (designated as T in this work)
required per link. However, in this work, only the case of confidential (T = 1) and
non-confidential demands will be considered.
4.1 Pre-processing Phase
Prior to the utilization of the heuristic approach, a pre-processing phase is required
that pre-calculates the candidate paths for each s-d pair. Also, a node-matching
procedure takes place, to ascertain whether two paths have at least two common
nodes traversed in the same order, so as to satisfy the ET and FSM constraints,
that are required for a feasible NC-RSA solution for the confidential demands.
First, a set of k candidate paths is pre-calculated for each s-d pair. Subse-
quently, to implement NC, the security level that each candidate path can provide
to the rest of the candidate paths must be calculated. According to the ET con-
straint, all links traversed by a secure confidential connection must transmit an
encrypted version of the data. This means that at least one XOR operation with
the established connections must be performed for all links in the path used by the
confidential connection. Let P be the set of all candidate paths, p the path under
consideration (p ∈ P ), and P ′ the set of the rest of the candidate paths that may
be used by path p to provide encryption over specific links of path p (P = P ′ ∪ p).
Also, let δpp′l be a coefficient which is equal to 1 if paths p ∈ P and p′ ∈ P ′ have
two common nodes and the lth link of path p can be “covered” (i.e., encryption is
provided) by path p′, and 0 otherwise.
Figure 3 provides an example of the δ coefficients for 3 paths {3−1−2−4, 2−
5− 6− 4, 2− 3− 5} utilized by 3 connections in the network. Hence, the links that
are covered for each pair of connections must be calculated (δ coefficient), with
regards to the common nodes of each pair of paths.
Fig. 3: Example of δ coefficient calculation
for 3 connections established in the network.
Table 3: δ coefficients for 3
paths established in the net-
work.
δpp′l δ
p
p′1 δ
p
p′2 δ
p
p′3
δ12l 0 0 1
δ13l 0 0 0
δ23l 1 0 0
δ21l 1 1 1
δ31l 0 0 -
δ32l 1 1 -
Assume that in this case initially the path under consideration is path p2. To
check whether the rest of the connections can provide security for the connection
using path p2,the following procedure is followed: path p2 has two common nodes
with path p1 (nodes 2 and 4) and since these nodes are the source and destination
nodes of p2, then connection p1 could be used to provide security for all links that
belong to p2. Hence, the values of δ
2
11, δ
2
12, and δ
2
13 are equal to 1 for the first,
second, and third link of path p2, respectively. It is important to note that on
the other hand, connection p2 can only provide security for the third link (link
2 − 4) of connection p1, resulting in δ123 = 1. Thus, clearly, δ21l 6= δ12l. Similarly,
the first link of p2 can be secured by p3, since nodes 2 and 5 are common between
these paths and therefore δ321 = 1. Also, in this case, p2 can be used to provide
security for all links in p3, since 2 and 5 are the source and destination nodes of
p3, respectively. Therefore, δ
2
31 = δ
2
32 = 1. Table 3 presents the δ coefficients for
all path combinations in this example.
It is noted that the order of the nodes in the path and the direction of the
path itself are taken into consideration in the determination of the δ coefficient.
For example, p3 has two common nodes with p1 (nodes 2 and 3), but it cannot
provide any security for that connection, since in path p3, node 2 is traversed
before node 3, whereas the opposite is the case with path p1. Algorithm 1 below
is used to calculate the δ coefficients. Specifically, to calculate the δ coefficients,
the algorithm takes as input the set of all the pre-calculated candidate paths P .
Then, for each pair of candidate paths p and p′, their common nodes are found
and they are stored in set CN . Next, if the size of set CN is greater than 1 (i.e.,
there are at least two common nodes between paths p and p′), then starting from
the source node, for each node i in path p, if that node is included in CN (i.e., i
is a common node for both p and p′), the order of the node p(i) in p′ is stored in
Snode. Subsequently, starting from the destination node of p, for each node j that
is traversed after node i in p, if the node is included in CN , the order of the node
p(j) in p′ is found and is stored in Enode. If Enode is greater than Snode (i.e., node
p(j) is traversed after node p(i) in both p and p′), then all the links between nodes
p(i) and p(j) in p can be secured by path p′. Thus, the δpp′ coefficient is equal to
1 for all these links.
Algorithm 1 Calculation of δ coefficients
Input: Set of candidate paths P
Output: δ coefficients
1: for each candidate path p ∈ P do
2: Z: number of nodes ∈ p
3: for each candidate path p′ ∈ P ′ do
4: Initialize empty set CN ,
5: Find common nodes between paths p and p′ and store them in CN
6: if |CN | > 1 then
7: for i = 1: Z do
8: if p(i) ∈ CN then
9: Snode = order of node p(i) in p
′
10: for j = Z: i+1 do
11: if p(j) ∈ CN then
12: Enode = order of node p(j) in p
′
13: if Enode > Snode then
14: L′: set of links between nodes p(i) and p(j) in path p
15: δp
p′l = 1 ∀l ∈ L′
16: Go to next candidate path p′ (line 3)
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end if
21: end for
22: end if
23: end for
24: end for
It is important to note that, using this process, it is ensured that node p(i) is
traversed prior to node p(j), which is also the case for path p′, in order for path p′
to provide security for path p. Further, if more than 2 common nodes are found,
the links secured may vary depending on which two common nodes are selected.
However, following this process, the set of common nodes that result in p′ securing
the largest number of links of path p is selected. This is a direct consequence of
the way the common nodes are selected (i.e., the first common node is found while
searching from the source node to the destination and the second common node
is found by starting from the destination node).
4.2 Routing
For the routing sub-problem, the pre-calculated k-shortest candidate paths that
are able to satisfy a requested connection are considered. These k-shortest paths
can be sorted based on different metrics (e.g., number of hops, modulation format,
most/least used nodes/links, etc.). In this work, each node (n) and link (l) are
characterized by the number of established connections that use them (denoted
as Un and Ul, respectively). Further, each path takes the value of the node/link
with the highest value of Un/Ul among all the nodes/links it traverses (Up,n, Up,l).
The paths of the non-confidential connections can then be sorted based on the
following criteria, which provide the best results in terms of spectrum utilization
and level of security, as presented in [12]:
– Most used nodes/links (MUN/MUL): The candidate paths for each s-
d pair are sorted in descending order based on the value Up,n/Up,l of each
path. By selecting the path which comprises of the most used nodes/links,
the number of XOR operations for a confidential connection will potentially
increase.
– Maximum spectrum efficiency (MSE): The candidate paths are sorted
in descending order based on the number of hops and the modulation format
used (hybrid metric defined in [21]). Thus, connections are established having
as an aim to maximize the spectrum efficiency of the network, rather than
maximizing the number of XOR operations.
After sorting the paths, the non-confidential connections are established using
the first path that has available spectrum resources, based on one of the afore-
mentioned sorting strategies.
For the confidential connections, the candidate path that produces the most
XOR operations is used, which also depends on the spectrum slots selected. To
achieve this, an XOR spectrum slot metric (XOR-SSMp) is used, that counts the
number of XOR operations performed for a specific path p and group of frequency
slots. In addition, the XOR-SSMp metric can be further differentiated as follows:
– Minimum XOR spectrum slot metric (MXOR-SSMp): The MXOR-
SSMp metric counts the minimum number of XOR operations over all links of
candidate path p. This is the metric that was first introduced and used in [12].
By using this metric the aim is to maximize the level of security provided for
the “weakest link” of the candidate path (the link with the least number of
XOR operations performed).
– Average XOR spectrum slot metric (AXOR-SSMp): The AXOR-SSMp
metric calculates the average number of XOR operations per link that are
provided for candidate path p. By using this metric the aim is to maximize the
average number of XOR operations performed on each link of the candidate
path (provided that the minimum threshold is met, as explained below).
4.3 Spectrum Allocation
For the spectrum allocation sub-problem, available spectrum resources must be
allocated for a requested connection satisfying the slot continuity, contiguity, and
non-overlapping constraints [2]. To calculate the number of frequency slots fdp
required for a given connection d if candidate path p is selected, we use fdp =
Bd
Brate·MFp , where Bd is the bit-rate requested by connection d, Brate is the baud
rate of each spectrum slot in the network, and MFp is the modulation format
(expressed in bits/symbol) that can be used for candidate path p, which is based
on the overall distance of path p.
For the non-confidential connections, the spectrum allocation is performed in a
first-fit manner, where the first group of frequency slots from the sorted candidate
paths that is able to establish the connection is allocated. For the confidential con-
nections, the process of allocating spectrum resources is based on maximizing the
number of XOR operations that can be performed for the selected path and group
of frequency slots, utilizing one of the two aforementioned XOR-SSM metrics. Al-
gorithm 2 below describes the NC-RSA approach for a given confidential demand.
Also, an example in Fig. 4 is used to better explain the proposed algorithm when
using either metric.
Algorithm 2 NC-RSA for a given confidential demand
Input: G(V,E), Set of candidate paths P, Paths currently established Pe, Confidential
demand D (s, d,B, 1), XOR threshold T , Spectrum slot metric S
Output: Confidential Connection Establishment
1: for each candidate path p ∈ Ps,d do
2: Find a set of paths Pused ∈ Pe that are used by the established connections, such that∑|V |
l=1 δ
p
p′l > 0, for each p
′ ∈ Pused
3: Create temporary matrix t = L × F , where L = number of links in path p and F =
overall number of frequency slots.
4: Initialize all entries of t to 0.
5: for each path pu ∈ Pused do
6: Using δppu coefficient, increase by one the values for each link l where δ
p
pul
= 1 and
spectrum slots that are covered by pu within t.
7: end for
8: Initialize XOR-SSMp = 0
9: if S == 0 then . MXOR-SSM is utilized
10: for each group (a − b) of available frequency slots (FS) in p that can be allocated
to D do
11: ca−bz =
∑b
n=a tz,n, for z = 1 to L
12: Ca−b = min(ca−b1 , ..., ca−bL )
13: XOR-SSMp = max(XOR-SSMp, Ca−b)
14: end for
15: else . AXOR-SSM is utilized
16: for each group (a− b) of available FS in p that can be allocated to D do
17: ca−bz =
∑b
n=a tz,n, for z = 1 to L
18: if min(ca−b1 , ..., c
a−b
L ) ≥ T then
19: Ca−b = (∑Lz=1 ca−bz )/L
20: XOR-SSMp = max(XOR-SSMp, Ca−b)
21: end if
22: end for
23: end if
24: end for
25: Select candidate path p with the highest value of the XOR-SSM metric.
26: if XOR-SSMp ≥ T then
27: Connection is established using path p and group of frequency slots (a− b).
28: else
29: Connection is rejected.
30: end if
Specifically, in Algorithm 2, for a given confidential connection, the XOR-SSMp
metric is calculated for each candidate path p. To do this, a temporary matrix (de-
noted as t in the algorithm) is used, with size L×F , where L denotes the number
of links of the candidate path and F denotes the overall number of frequency slots
of each link in the network. Next, the set of the already established paths with a
non-zero vector coefficient δppu for path p under investigation is found (denoted as
Pused in the algorithm, pu ∈ Pused). This set of paths can be used to satisfy the ET
constraint. Subsequently, for each path pu, the values for the links and spectrum
slots that are covered by pu within t are increased by 1. Next, for each available
group of frequency slots (a−b), the number of XOR operations performed on each
link z of path p are calculated using the following equation: ca−bz =
∑b
n=a tz,n,
where a and b are the starting and ending slots selected. In the case that MXOR-
SSM is selected, the minimum Ca−b = min(ca−b1 , ..., ca−bL ) value is selected (i.e.,
the weakest link in terms of the number of XOR operations performed in path p is
considered). On the other hand, in the case that AXOR-SSM is selected, then if the
minimum number of XOR operations on each link is greater than or equal to the
given acceptable threshold [min(ca−b1 , ..., c
a−b
L ) ≥ T ], the average number of XOR
operations per link in the candidate path p and group of frequency slots (a− b) is
calculated via Ca−b = (∑Lz=1 ca−bz )/L. This procedure (for MXOR-SSM or AXOR-
SSM) is repeated for all groups of frequency slots, and the group of frequency slots
with the maximum value of C is selected. In addition, this procedure is repeated
for all candidate paths that can establish connection s-d, and the maximum value
of C amongst all candidate paths is selected and is considered as the value of the
XOR metric for path p (using either the MXOR-SSM or the AXOR-SSM metric).
If the XOR metric found has a value greater than or equal to threshold T , then the
connection is established in that group of frequency slots. Otherwise, it is rejected.
The value of the metric (e.g., x) selected signifies that either at least x XOR op-
erations are used to secure the confidential connection in each link (using MXOR-
SSM) or an average number of x XOR operations are used to provide security for
each link of that connection, given that the threshold requirement T is satisfied at
each link of the path (using AXOR-SSM). Both processes also imply that the ET
and FSM constraints are satisfied for that confidential connection. On the other
hand, if x < T , there is at least one link in the path where the threshold require-
ment is not satisfied, and the connection is not considered secure.
To clearly demonstrate this procedure, in Fig. 4, assume a network with F =
5 and a candidate path p1 (1− 2− 6) that requires 3 frequency slots. Also, the set
Pe of connections currently established in the network consists of paths {p2, p3,
p4, p5, p6, p7, p8}. Table 4 provides information on each path (route along with
the spectrum slots that each connection utilizes). Also, the δ coefficient is shown
for each path in Pe and path p1.
Fig. 4: Example of NC-RSA algorithm for a given confidential connection.
As discussed in the previous sections, a path must have at least two common nodes
with the confidential one to provide security for that connection. Thus, p4 is not
Table 4: Information for connections currently established in the network.
Connection
Id
Path
Selected
Spectrum
Slots allocated
δp1
p′1 δ
p1
p′2
p2 2− 4− 6− 3 4− 5 0 1
p3 1− 4− 5− 6 3− 4 1 1
p4 2− 3 1− 2 0 0
p5 1− 2 1 1 0
p6 6− 2 1− 3 0 0
p7 2− 3− 6 4− 5 0 1
p8 1− 4− 2 1− 2 1 0
able to provide any security for connection p1. Also, since the direction of the path
and the common nodes plays a key role in providing security for the confidential
connection, path p6 is also not able to provide any security for the given demand.
As a result, Pused consists of paths {p2, p3, p5, p7, p8}. For example, connection p2
contributes to cells t(2,4) and t(2,5), since it can cover spectrum slots 4 and 5 in the
second link of p1. On the other hand, connection p5 could provide security to the
confidential connection, but since it uses the same link as p1, the spectrum slots
allocated to p5 (i.e., slot 1) are excluded from the available group of frequency
slots to satisfy the non-overlapping constraint. This value is designated as ‘−’.
The resulting t matrix using all paths in Pused is shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Number of XOR operations per
slot (t matrix).
Spectrum Slot id
1 2 3 4 5
Link
id
1 (1-2) − 1 1 1 0
2 (2-6) − 0 1 3 2
Table 6: Number of XOR operations
per link and group of available fre-
quency slots.
c2−4z c3−5z
Link
id (z)
1 3 2
2 4 6
Next, the number of XOR operations must be calculated for each group of fre-
quency slots that could be used to establish the confidential demand. To calculate
the number of XOR operations on link 1 and frequency slots 2− 4, c2−41 = t(1,2)
+ t(1,3) + t(1,4) = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3. The same process is performed for all links that
belong to the candidate path and the selected group of frequency slots 3− 5. It is
noted that this process is not performed for spectrum slots 1 − 3, since they are
not available for the confidential demand. The result for each group of frequency
slots and the links of the candidate path is shown in Table 6.
Finally, to calculate the XOR-SSM metric, C must be calculated for each
group of available frequency slots. In case the MXOR-SSM metric is used, C2−4 =
min(c2−41 , c
2−4
2 ) = min(3, 4)= 3, and C3−5 = min(c3−51 , c3−52 ) = min(2, 6) = 2 re-
spectively, as shown in Table 7 for the group of frequency slots 2−4 and 3−5. Now,
XOR-SSMp1 = max(C2−4, C3−5) = max(3, 2) = 3, using frequency slots 2 − 4.
On the other hand, if the AXOR-SSM metric is used, C2−4 = (c2−41 + c2−42 )/2 =
(3 + 4)/2 = 3.5, and C3−5 = (c3−51 + c3−52 )/2 = (2 + 6)/2 = 4 (Table 8). Hence,
XOR-SSMp = max(3.5, 4) = 4 using frequency slots 3 − 5. It is noted that, for
example, in the case T = 3, then this would not be an acceptable solution (i.e.,
min(2, 6) = 2 < T ) and therefore, frequency slots 2− 4 would be selected.
Table 7: Calculation of C for each group
of frequency slots using MXOR-SSM.
Group of
frequency
slots (x - y)
2 - 4 3 - 5
Cx−y 3 2
Table 8: Calculation of C for each group
of frequency slots using AXOR-SSM.
Group of
frequency
slots (x - y)
2 - 4 3 - 5
Cx−y 3.5 4
Following either approach to solve the NC-RSA problem for the confidential
demands will, in many cases, result in a high blocking probability, since confidential
connections that do not meet the required threshold T are immediately blocked.
To overcome this problem, the algorithms illustrated in the flowchart of Fig. 5 is
proposed.
Fig. 5: Flowchart of proposed algorithm to minimize blocking (eliminate blocking due to the
level of security requirements)
As shown in the flowchart, the candidate paths are first pre-calculated and
the δ coefficient is calculated for each pair of paths. Then, a typical RSA is im-
plemented for the non-confidential demands with one of the routing strategies
proposed, while the NC-RSA algorithm is used for the confidential demands with
either the MXOR-SSM or AXOR-SSM metrics utilized. After all demands are al-
located in the network, the confidential connections that are not secured (i.e., less
XOR operations than the threshold T are performed in at least one link of their
selected path), and were previously rejected are re-entered in the network and the
NC-RSA is again solved for these connections (utilizing now existing connections
that were not available the first time the NC-RSA heuristic was implemented).
Also, the new number of XOR operations is calculated for the already established
demands. Finally, any confidential connection that was not previously established
is the network, as it was not meeting the level of security requirements, is now
established, regardless of the level of security provided (these connections are later
on in the performance section identified as unsecured confidential connections (e.g.,
Fig. 10 illustrates the percentage of secured confidential demands)). Nevertheless
blocking still exists due to lack of network resources for both non-confidential as
well as confidential connections. It is noted that additional (dummy) lightpaths
can be added with the sole purpose to ensure security for the confidential connec-
tions that do not reach the required threshold T . However, this is not within the
focus of this work and will be considered as future work.
5 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the proposed heuristic algorithm, an EON is implemented using band-
width variable transponders that operate using the following modulation formats:
BPSK, QPSK, 8-QAM, and 16-QAM. The transmission reach for each modula-
tion format is given by 9300, 4600, 1700, and 800 km respectively. The network
topology utilized in the simulations is shown in Fig. 6, consisting of 14 nodes and
42 directed links. For this network, a flexible grid is implemented, with a channel
spacing of 12.5 GHz which results in a total of 320 spectrum slots with a baud rate
of 10.7 Gbauds for each link in the network. The requested demands are randomly
generated using a uniform distribution for all s-d pairs, where each demand size
varies from 20 to 100 Gbps, while the number of candidate paths used for the
first set of simulations is set to 5 (k=5). Each presented result is the average of
10 experiments performed with different generated sets of demands, where for all
simulations 30% of the overall number of demands are designated as confidential.
Finally, a PC with an i7-3930K CPU and 24 GB RAM is used for all simulations.
Fig. 6: Network topology used
in the simulations, consisting of
14 nodes and 42 directed links.
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Fig. 7: Average number of minimum XOR
operations over all confidential demands.
When using network coding, the level of security provided for a confidential
connection can by quantified by the minimum and average number of XOR oper-
ations performed on each link of its established path. In this work, the threshold
for the number of XOR operations that a connection must have on each link of its
path in order to be considered as secure is set to 1 (T = 1). This means that the
number of XOR operations (N) that must be performed at each link of the path
used by a given confidential connection must be N ≥ 1, in order to consider the
specific connection as secure.
By increasing the minimum number of XOR operations that occur at the links
of the established path for the confidential connection, then even if an eavesdropper
taps the weakest link of this confidential connection (i.e., the link with the smallest
number of XOR operations performed), all connections used in these XOR opera-
tions will have to be compromised before the eavesdropper can make sense of the
confidential information. The average number of minimum XOR operations over
all confidential demands is presented in Fig. 7, when the three routing strategies
are utilized for both the AXOR-SSM and MXOR-SSM metrics.
Using the MXOR-SSM-MUL or MXOR-SSM-MUN routing strategies provides
the highest minimum number of XOR operations performed for each demand, on
average, compared to the rest of the cases examined. This is to be expected, since
the MXOR-SSM metric has as an aim to select the candidate path and group of
frequency slots that maximize the minimum number of XOR operations for the
confidential demand. Further, it is shown that by using the AXOR-SSM metric and
either the MUL or MUN routing algorithms provides results close to the MXOR-
SSM algorithm. This is due to the fact that in this case a relatively small number of
candidate paths is utilized. Thus, in order to satisfy the required XOR threshold for
each link, while also maximizing the average number of XOR operations, a solution
where the minimum number of XOR operations is close to the MXOR-SSM case
is selected. Indeed, as shown in Table 9 below, the difference between AXOR-
SSM and MXOR-SSM, in terms of the minimum number of XOR operations per
demand, increases with the number of candidate paths. Finally, the MSE routing
strategy provides the least number of XOR operations per confidential connection
which is to be expected, since it has as an aim to add non-confidential connections
in a spectrum efficient manner, rather than to provide more XOR operations for
the confidential ones. Nevertheless, in all cases, the results indicate that on the
average the minimum number of XOR operations that take place per link per
demand is between 2-3, higher than the predefined XOR threshold (T = 1).
As discussed in the previous sections, the number of XOR operations performed
on each link is a key point for the level of security provided to a confidential de-
mand. Accounting for the average number of XOR operations per link per demand
is another useful metric that could describe the average amount of connections
that have to be compromised to make the confidential demand vulnerable. Thus,
Figure 8 presents the average number of XOR operations per link per confidential
connection in the network, when using different slot allocation metrics and routing
techniques for the candidate paths.
The AXOR-SSM metric provides the best results in terms of the average num-
ber of XOR operations performed, which is to be expected, since it has as an aim
to maximize the total number of XOR operations for a connection, as long as the
XOR threshold is satisfied for all links. On the other hand, using the MXOR-SSM
metric, which aims to maximize the minimum number of XOR operations over all
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Fig. 8: Average number of XOR opera-
tions per link per confidential connection.
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Fig. 9: Blocking probability for different
routing strategies and XOR spectrum slot
metrics.
links of the demand, does not always provide the best results in terms of the total
number of XOR operations performed for the confidential connections. Further,
the MUL routing strategy results in a larger number of XOR operations compared
to both the MSE and MUN routing strategies when either spectrum allocation
metric is used. This is due to the fact that since the direction of the paths in the
XOR process is taken into consideration, a confidential path that can use other
existing connections traversing a highly utilized link (i.e., traverses the nodes in
the same order through a link-disjoint path) will potentially increase the XOR
operations performed in its path. Thus, utilizing the MUL sorting technique max-
imizes the utilization of specific links in the network, which subsequently results
in providing a higher level of security for the confidential demands (contrary to
results in [12], where the direction of the paths was not considered).
Next, the blocking probability of the network is presented (Fig. 9) when differ-
ent metrics and routing techniques are utilized. In this figure, the case where all
connections are designated as non-confidential, allocated using the MSE routing
strategy, is also presented as a benchmark (designated as “0% MSE”). It is clearly
demonstrated that the MUL routing strategy results in a much higher blocking
probability compared to the MSE case, since the paths chosen, utilizing the former
strategy, aim to increase the level of security of the confidential connection (by be-
ing utilized at the most used links or nodes), rather than to maximize the efficient
use of spectrum resources, which is precisely the aim of the latter strategy. In fact,
the MSE approach, satisfies the appropriate threshold of XOR operations per link
in the network, while also providing a very low blocking probability, similar to the
performance of the benchmark case.
Clearly, the number of candidate paths for each s-d pair that a confidential
connection can use will also have a great impact on the network performance in
terms of the level of security, blocking probability, and spectrum utilization, as
shown in Table 9. Note that only results for the MXOR-SSM-MUL, AXOR-SSM-
MUL and AXOR-SSM-MSE policies are shown, as these policies provide the best
results (as previously shown in Figs. 7-9). Again, the results for the 0%-MSE case
are provided as benchmark.
From Table 9, it is evident that the larger the number of candidate paths for
each s-d pair, the larger the number of XOR operations that can be performed for
Table 9: Impact of k on level of security, blocking probability, and spectrum utilization.
Result Technique
k
5 10 20
Average number of
minimum XOR
operations
MXOR-SSM-MUL 2.45 2.83 3.09
AXOR-SSM-MUL 2.38 2.75 2.99
AXOR-SSM-MSE 2.02 2.19 2.50
0% - MSE - - -
Average number
of XOR operations
per link per demand
MXOR-SSM-MUL 2.66 3.17 3.60
AXOR-SSM-MUL 2.95 3.76 4.28
AXOR-SSM-MSE 2.36 2.87 3.57
0% - MSE - - -
Blocking
probability
MXOR-SSM-MUL 0.04 0.11 0.17
AXOR-SSM-MUL 0.04 0.13 0.20
AXOR-SSM-MSE 0 0 0
0% - MSE 0 0 0
Number of
spectrum slots
utilized
MXOR-SSM-MUL 7561 8429 9219
AXOR-SSM-MUL 7734 8723 9456
AXOR-SSM-MSE 5243 5754 6538
0% - MSE 4232 4257 4322
each confidential demand. Thus, both the average and minimum number of XOR
operations increase as k increases, for all NC-RSA strategies. It should be noted
though, that as k increases, the number of additional spectrum slots utilized, as
well as the blocking probability will also increase, since now both confidential and
non-confidential demands will use paths that are not efficient in terms of spectrum
utilization, as they instead select a solution which maximizes the number of XOR
operations performed by the confidential demands. Thus, the choice of k should
be one that provides a balanced solution between the efficiency of the network and
the level of security provided for the confidential demands.
From the results presented, for any choice of k (and as discussed previously),
the AXOR-SSM-MUL approach provides the highest number of XOR operations
on average for each confidential demand, while also satisfying the minimum thresh-
old for each link for all confidential connections. On the other hand, the AXOR-
SSM-MSE approach provides a much lower blocking probability, while achieving a
slightly smaller number of XOR operations. Thus, for the rest of the simulations,
the AXOR-SSM-MUL approach, which provides the best results in terms of the
level of security provided for the confidential demands and the AXOR-SSM-MSE
approach, which provides the most efficient usage of the spectrum while providing
an acceptable level of security for the confidential connections will be utilized. In
conjunction, a set of 10 candidate paths for each s-d pair will be used, in order to
provide a balanced solution in terms of level of security and spectrum efficiency.
Also, 1500 connections are now established in the network to better illustrate how
each approach performs as the number of demands increases considerably.
The percentage of the established confidential connections that are properly
secured (i.e., satisfying the ET and FSM constraints) is subsequently presented in
Fig. 10. As shown in this figure, different routing techniques can have a significant
effect on the number of secure confidential connections. Clearly, from the results
presented, the MUL technique performs better compared to the MSE routing strat-
egy, since connections are forced to traverse the same links, and therefore, more
connections can be found that can be XOR-ed with the confidential connection.
However, it is noted that when using the MSE routing strategy, the percentage of
secure connections increases with the number of demands that are established in
the network. On the other hand, the percentage of confidential connections that
are securely established in the network utilizing the MUL strategy decreases as
the number of demands increases, since the resources of the candidate paths that
could provide security for the confidential demands are saturated, leading to the
usage of less secure candidate paths. In order to secure all confidential demands,
it is again noted that additional dummy lightpaths can be utilized in the XOR
process in order to provide security for any unsecured confidential connections
established in the network.
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Fig. 10: Percentage of secured confidential connections established in the network (k = 10).
Next, the blocking probability is presented in Fig. 11 when more connections
(1500) are established in the network and more candidate paths (k = 10) are
considered for each connection. From the results obtained, again the MUL sorting
strategy is shown to provide a much higher blocking probability compared to
the MSE strategy. In fact, the MSE strategy provides a much lower blocking
probability, close to the benchmark case, for a large percentage of connections
(more than 90% for more than 1000 demands), while also satisfying the appropriate
threshold of XOR operations per link in the network (Fig. 10).
Selecting different routing and spectrum allocation strategies for each confiden-
tial connection will, on the one hand, secure the confidential connections against
an eavesdropping attack, but, on the other hand, could force the algorithm to devi-
ate from an efficient spectrum utilization solution. Figure 12 presents the number
of utilized spectrum slots when using the MUL and MSE routing strategies versus
the benchmark case (all connections are designated as non-confidential and the
candidate paths are routed based on the MSE technique). In this case, there is
no blocking in the network (enough network resources are available), in order to
obtain the exact number of spectrum resources utilized for each set of demands.
As shown in the figure, the MUL routing strategy (which provides the largest
number of XOR operations, on average, for the confidential connections) requires
much more spectrum resources to establish all connections, compared to MSE.
On the other hand, using the MSE approach to provide security for confidential
connections results in an acceptable (i.e., above designated threshold) number of
XOR operations on average for the confidential demands, while at the same time
it requires much fewer resources compared to the MUL case. In fact, using MSE,
the number of additional resources allocated to the network is slightly increased
compared to the case where all connections are not confidential (“0%-MSE” -
benchmark case). This is the case, since all non-confidential connections are as-
signed using the best path available (in terms of hops and modulation format).
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Fig. 11: Blocking probability using
different routing techniques (k = 10).
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Fig. 12: Number of spectrum slots utilized to
establish all connections in the network.
6 Conclusions
In this work, a novel heuristic approach is proposed, that utilizes the concept of
network coding in EONs to provide security for confidential connections against
eavesdropping attacks. Using the proposed approach, the physical layer security
is increased, since connections established at link-disjoint paths combine their
datastreams to encrypt the confidential data, thus an eavesdropper must now
compromise several connections traversing different parts of the network in order
to make sense of any accessed confidential data.
Performance results indicate that using the average XOR spectrum slot metric
(AXOR-SSM) to evaluate each candidate path and group of spectrum slots re-
quired for the confidential demands results in a higher number of XOR operations
performed on each link of the confidential path, and thus it provides an increased
level of security against an adversary that attempts to compromise confidential
data. Also, the combination of the AXOR-SSM metric with the most used links
(MUL) routing strategy, provides the highest number of XOR operations for each
confidential demand at the expense of a significant increase in the spectrum re-
sources utilized, while the maximum spectrum efficiency (MSE) routing strategy
provides a similar number of XOR operations at the expense of a small percentage
of additional spectrum slots. Therefore, using the AXOR-SSM-MSE approach, the
required level of security of the confidential connections is achieved, while spec-
trum utilization and blocking probability are similar to the ones for the benchmark
case, where all connections are considered as non-confidential.
Ongoing work includes the development of integer linear programming (ILP)
formulations to provide an optimal solution to the NC-RSA problem, as well as
the consideration of additional physical layer constraints that are imposed by the
utilization of network coding via XOR operations.
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